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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for a breach of contract 
which existed between the parties for the production 
and marketing of a plastic ski boot. The defendant 
failed to manufacture the boots as agreed. Plaintiff 
seeks a return of payments made to Defendant and 
other damages resulting from defendant's breach. 
The plaintiff, Union Ski Company, a Utah corporation, 
caused a summons to be served upon the defendant, 
Union Plastics Corporation. To enhance the chances 
of settlement the plaintiff and the defendant entered 
into a stipulation that allowed the plaintiff to 
file a simple, one-page statement of the cause of 
action with the right to amend the same at a later 
date, and which allowed the defendant to withhold 
its answer to the complaint until an answer was 
demanded in writing from the plaintiff. When settle-
ment negotiations broke down, the plaintiff demanded 
that the defendant answer the complaint, and the 
defendant moved the court to quash service of process 
i 
and to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction 
over the defendant corporation, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After the submission of briefs and affidavits 
of the parties, the district court denied defendant's 
motion to quash sercice of process and granted 
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of juris-
diction. The court made no finds and no basis of the 
decision was stated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks this court's reversal of 
that ruling dismissing the cause of action for lack 
of jurisdiction and remand the matter to the district 
court for trial. 
-2-
STATEMENT OF PACTS 
The plaintiff^ Union Ski Company, is a Utah 
corporation with its sole place of business located 
at Provo, Utah* The corporation was organized by 
limited stock offering to the residents of the state 
of Utah* The plaintiff was organized for the purpose 
of marketing internationally a plastic ski boot 
which was designed by the defendant and which was 
to be manufactured by the defendant. (Tarran Affidavit 
R106 Line 11) Since the ski boot which was to be 
manufactured by the defendant was plaintiff's sole 
product^ and none were ever manufactured/ the plain-
tiff has closed its offices, discharged its per-
sonnel/and has otherwise ceased all operations 
as a business. (Jolly Affidavit R51) 
The defendant/ Union Plastics Corporation/ 
is a corporation organized under the laws of the 
State of California/ with its principal place of 
business at North Hollywood/ California. The 
said defendant is a wholly-owned subsidiary and 
division of the Union Corporation/ Verona/ Pennnsyl-
vania. The defendant is in the business of manu-
facturing plastic products. 
The plaintiff's position is that the courts 
of Utah have jurisdiction over the defendant upon 
several grounds: FIRST, the defendant's negotiations 
in the state of Utah with the plaintiff (and its 
predecessor in interest, Sports Industries, Inc.,) 
in December of 1973 and January resulting in a 
contract constitute a transaction of business in 
the state of Utah within the meaning of Utah's "long-
arm" statute, section 78-27-24(1) (supp. 1969t) ; 
SECOND, the defendant contracted to supply goods 
to and through the Plaintiff to residents of the 
state of Utah within the meaning of Utah's "long-
arm" statute, section 78-27-24(2) (supp. 1969); 
THIRD, that the defendant's substantial business 
contacts with the state of Utah warrent the assertion 
of jurisdiction under common law standards; FOURTH, 
the defendant, by and through its' attorney, by stipu-
lation, agreed that an amended complaint could be 
filed in this action, and that service of process 
by registered mail to defendant's attorney was sufficient 
and good service of the defendant. 
The defendant contends that it was not trans-
acting business in this state, either within the 
meaning of the "long-arm" statute or under common 
law jurisdictional standards, and further contends 
that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts 
with the state of Utah to permit a constitutional 
assertion of jurisdiction by Utah courts, and that 
several grounds: FIRST, the defendant's negotiations 
in the state of Utah with the plaintiff (and its 
predecessor in interest, Sports Industries, Inc.,) 
in December of 1973 and January resulting in a 
contract constitute a transaction of business in 
the state of Utah within the meaning of Utah's "long-
arm" statute, section 78-27-24 (1) (supp. 1969t); 
SECOND, the defendant contracted to supply goods 
to and through the Plaintiff to residents of the 
state of Utah within the meaning of Utahfs "long-
arm" statute, section 78-27-24(2) (supp. 1969); 
THIRD, that the defendant's substantial business 
contacts with the state of Utah warrent the assertion 
of jurisdiction under common law standards; FOURTH, 
the defendant, by and through its' attorney, by stipu-
lation, agreed that an amended complaint could be 
filed in this action, and that service of process 
by registered mail to defendant's attorney was sufficient 
and good service of the defendant. 
The defendant contends that it was not trans-
acting business in this state, either within the 
meaning of the "long-arm" statute or under common 
law jurisdictional standards, and further contends 
that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts 
with the state of Utah to permit a constitutional 
assertion of jurisdiction by Utah courts, and that 
the service of summons was not sufficient. 
The defendant's positions, however, are un-
tenable for numerous reasons. There are numerous 
undisputed facts which clearly show that the defen-
dant was transacting business within the meaning 
of the U.C.A. 78-24-24(1). Arthur Eizenberg, the 
general manager of the defendant corporation, admits 
he made four business trips to Utah to transact 
business related to plaintiff's cause of action. 
Mr. Eizenberg's affidavit says that during the trip 
of December 28, 1973, he held discussions with 
Brent Hall concerning the finalization of the 
agreement which is the subject of this lawsuit. 
(Eizenberg Aff. R23, Line 4) The agreement was 
not finalized as a result of that trip and Mr. 
Eizenberg again returned to Utah on January 4, 1974, 
to conduct further negotiations. On January 5, 
1974, plaintiff's predecessor in interest, Sports 
Industries, Inc., and the defendant had reached 
an agreement, and reduced the agreement of the 
parties to writing. (Hall Aff. R66; Wood Aff. R98; 
Jolley Aff. RIOlj Tarran Aff. R107) 
The agreement reached by the parties was based 
principally upon a proposed contract which had been 
prepared by the lawyers of the Defendant's parent 
corporation, Union Corporation of Verona, Pennsylvania. 
The agreement briefly summarized provided, among 
other things, that the defendant would design and 
manufacture a plastic ski boot to be marketed by 
Sports Industries, Inc.; the defendant specifically 
warrented that as of July 1, 1974, they could produce 
sufficient quantitites to meet the required sales 
volumes indicated in the contract; that Sports Industries 
was to make advance payments to Union Plastics for 
the boots that it was to produce; that Sports 
Industries was to be the exclusive distributors 
of the boot to be manufactured by the defendant; 
if plaintiff's sales of the ski boot would "yield 
to Union . . . minimum revenues" of $600,000.00 
for the year 1974, and increasing thereafter to 
a "minimum annual gross to Union of $2,000,000.00 
by 1978." 
Pursuant to the agreement, plaintiff (Sports 
Industries, Inc.,) by a check dated January 5, 
1974, paid defendant $25,000.00. (Jolley Aff. R100 
9T 13) The defendant shortly thereafter negotiated 
the said instrument, (copy of check R99) 
The defendant contends that the contract was 
never executed in Utah, but does, as noted above, 
admit that it was partially negotiated in Utah. 
(Eizenberg Aff. R23 Line 4) All future amendments 
to the contract continued to show January 5, 1974, 
as the effective date of the contract. In February 
of 1974, Sports Industries principals formed the 
plaintiff corporation and assigned the contract 
to it. The defendant has never denied the existance 
of the contract; their only denial has been that 
the contract was not signed on January 5, 1974. 
It is clear that the parties considered January 
5 as the effective date of the contract since both 
parties commenced performance immediately. As a 
result of the distributorship contract, plaintiff 
held a "kick-off" sales meeting on January 11, 1974, 
at Provo, Utah. In furtherance of the January 5th 
agreement, defendant's general manager, Arthur 
Eizenberg, attended that sales meeting and was the 
featured speaker. (Eizenberg Aff. R23, Aff. R100; 
Scmidt Aff. R21, Hall Aff. R114; Tarran Aff. R107; 
Jensen Aff. R103) The sales efforts of the plaintiff 
were very successfulf and by April 30, 197 4, the 
general manager of the defendant was able to report 
in writing to the parent company the following: 
To date we have orders (from the plain-
tiff) for approximately 10,000 pair, or 
approximately $218,000.00 These orders 
represent trial quantities only, and in 
many cases are dependent upon the customer's 
approval of the first shipment, or pair of 
"production" boots that can be tried 
on. This represents a tremendous acceptance 
of a new, untried product. (Eizenberg Letter 
Rill) 
The undisputed facts also clearly show that 
the defendant contracted to supply goods in the 
state of Utah as contemplated by Section 78-27-24(2). 
The defendant entered into a contract while 
in Utah to supply goods and services exclusively 
to plaintiff in Utah. Plaintiff has alleged that 
its claim arises from defendant's failure to supply 
the goods. By April 2 0, 1974, the defendant had 
already received orders for approximately $218,000.00 
worth of ski boots. (Eizenberg Letter Rill) The 
January 5, 1974, agreement provided that the sales 
would be recorded in the name of the plaintiff with 
delivery directly to plaintiffs customers. 
The defendant attempts to explain away these 
sales to plaintiff and its customers by stating 
that the contract provides for FOB Los Angeles. 
Various courts, in construing the "long-arm" statute, 
have held that the FOB point is immaterial when 
considering whether or not a party has in fact 
contracted to supply services or goods to a resident 
of a particular state. It is undisputed that the 
defendant accepted orders from the plaintiff for 
goods sold to the plaintiff to be shipped to the 
plaintiff sole office and outlet and to other Utah 
retail outlets. 
Defendant's trip to Utah on December 28, 197 3, 
was to conduct, face to face negotiations for the 
sale of its goods to the plaintiff in Utah. On 
January 5, 1974, while in Utah, defendant's general 
manager entered into a contract to supply plaintiff 
goods. The defendant accepted plaintiff's money 
and money orders pursuant to that contract. The 
defendant had to contemplate that many of the,ski 
boots would be shipped to Utah directly from defend-
ant's plant. 
The defendant appears to be arguing that all of 
tests for the statutory "transacting business" and 
the test for "doing business" in Utah are the same. 
Such is not the case. Under the Utah "long-arm" 
statute the transaction of business does not neces-
sitate a showing that a foreign corporation is in 
fact doing business in Utah under the traditional 
common law tests of doing business. The uniform 
"long-arm" statute, which Utah has adopted, codifies 
the Supreme Court approved doctrine that certain 
acts of a individual or foreign corporation will 
subject that person or corporation to the jurisdic-
tion of local courts to defend claims based upon 
those activities regardless of what other busi-
ness acts or activites the non-resident or foreign 
corporation may or may not have transacted within 
the state. 
The transaction of business, in the "long-
arm" statute is clear and unambiguous for it defines 
any act "affecting" persons or businesses in this 
state as an act of transacting business. Under 
this definitionf a plaintiff need show only a claim 
arising from a form-related act which involves 
persons or businesses in this state. The defendant 
never has, nor can he deny, that his negotiations 
and contracting with the plaintiff in this state 
have obviously affected the plaintiff and that 
its Utah negotiated contract is the basis of this 
action. 
Even if the District Court does not have juris-
diction over the defendant under the "long-arm" 
statute, the courts of Utah do have jurisdiction 
under the traditional doing business concept. The 
undisputed contacts of the defendant are substantial 
enough to meet the guidelines laid down in Hill 
v. Zale Corporation, 25U.2d357,482 P.2d 332. 
While it may be true that the defendant does 
not physically have any local offices, stores, or 
outlets independent of the plaintiff, the plain-
tiff certainly acted as an outlet in Utah for de-
fendant 's goods. The defendant categorized the 
plaintiff as its "exclusive sales and merchandising 
operation" for its boots. Plaintiff's Utah (and 
only office was defendant's sole national outlet. 
(Eizenberg Letter paragraph IV R110) Any skier 
desiring to purchase defendant's ski boots were 
required to purchase the same through the plaintiff, 
whose sole place of business was located at Provo, 
Utah. 
Second, the defendant does not deny it hired, 
fired, and paid Utah residents to perform work in 
Utah in the production of the ski boots. The defend-
ant hired the services of Mr. Wight of Salt Lake 
City, and, according to Mr. Eizenberg's affidavit, 
he personally came to Utah to review Mr. Wight's 
progress. (Eizenberg Aff. R 23, 24, 25) The defendant 
had the sole supervision of Mr. Wight and became 
dissatisfied with his work and discharged him. 
The defendant then requested the plaintiff's help 
in locating another artisan to complete the work 
commenced by Mr. Wight. Mr. Hall located an artisan 
by the name of Frank Riggs of Alpine, Utah. 
Riggs discussed the nature of the project by 
phone with Mr, Eizenberg and agreed to work on the 
project at an hourly rate of $10.00 per hour. Mr. 
Riggs received models of the boots from the defendant 
and all direction on the prject came from the defend-
ant. All problems and questions were directed to 
the defendant. Mr. Eizenberg flew to Utah and 
reviewed Mr. Riggs' work. (Eizenberg Aff. R 23, 
24) Mr. Riggs received several pay checks from 
the defendant's parent corporation, namely Union 
Corporation of Verona, Pennsylvania, for the work 
performed for the defendant on an hourly basis. 
(Riggs Aff. R 96; copy of one Paycheck stub R 93) 
Contrary to defendant's claims, the defendant 
did advertise in the state of Utah by several methods. 
These advertising efforts were part of a preconceived 
plan on the part of the defendant to advertise its 
own company name directly and also indirectly through 
the plaintiff. The defendant, almost from the begin-
ing, insisted that the plaintiff insure that the 
name "UNION" be constantly "put before the buying 
public." (R110) The name of the plaintiff. Union 
Ski Company, was chosen because the defendant in-
sisted that the name "Union" be broadly advertised 
and used by the plaintiff whenever and wherever 
possible. 
The defendant further sought to advertise its 
company and its parent company in Utah, and through-
out the nation, by furnishing literature and stock 
holders' reports to the plaintiff, to be distributed 
with the literature of the plaintiff to help generate 
sales of the ski boot. The said literature of the 
defendant was, in fact, distributed both nationally 
at trade shows and locally in Utah, and used in 
obtaining orders for defendants ski boots. To 
further advertise the defendant's involvement in 
the sale of the ski boots, defendant's General 
Manager personally distributed literature about 
defendant at plaintiff's sales booths at trade shows 
in Bostonf Chicago, and Las Vegas. The defendant 
provided information and photographs of defendant's 
plant and equipment to be used by the plaintiff 
in its sales literature. That literature was mailed 
to Utah ski boot customers. 
The defendant consistently requested that the 
plaintiff advertise the defendant as the manufacturer 
of the ski boot. This reason became apparent when 
Mr. Eizenberg gave Mr. Hall a copy of a letter 
between Mr. Eizenberg and his superior, Mr. Haden. 
The last sentence of page 3 of that letter states: 
"If they [Union Ski Company] do not meet 
the goals in our contract, we [Union 
Plastics Corporation] are free to market 
OUR product in any way we see fit. Mean-
while the UNION name has been put before 
the buying public." [emphasis in original 
text] 
Defendant's activities within the state meet 
the fourth guideline set forth in Hill v. Zale, 
in that the defendant has had, and still has, per-
sonal property within the state of Utah and negotiate 
banking arrangements in the State of Utah. The 
defendant shipped samples to the sculpturer, Mr. 
Riggs, and to the plaintiff. (copy of shipping 
bills at R 91, 92) Some of the initial sculpture 
work and various model designs belonging to the 
defendant are still located in Utah. 
On one of Mr. Eizenberg's trips to Utah, he* 
and the principal officers of the plaintiff met 
with a Mr. Douglas Black of Tracy-Collins Bank and . 
Trust Company in Salt Lake City. In that meeting 
with Mr. Black, it was determined that a special 
account would be set up at Tracy-Collins Bank and 
Trust Company, in the name of the defendant and 
the plaintiff. Customers would pay their invoices 
directly to that Utah bank account. No account 
was actually opened that day in the name of the 
defendant since it would not be needed until ship-
ments commenced. Because defendant never manufactured 
any ski boots, shipments were never commenced. 
Defendant does not deny the meeting but only denies 
that an account was opened. 
Defendant's activities within the state of 
Utah were continuous and systematic and not sporadic 
or transitory. Defendant's management at the highest 
levels of the corporation visited Utah as often 
as they deemed necessary to secure sales, to review 
production, to participate in sales meetings of 
the plaintiff, to negotiate with a bank, to review 
plaintiff's obligations under the contract. While 
the visits may have been of short duration, the 
"activities" generated therby were continuous and 
systematic. Models were shipped to Utah, phone 
calls and letters on numerous occasions were exchanged, 
and artisans were working regularly under the direction 
of the defendant, all as a result of defendant's 
activities within the state. (Schmidt Aff. R21, 
Eizenberg Aff. R23; Kinder Aff. R28). 
The sixth guideline set down by Hill v. Zale, 
supra, is fully met in the instant case. The vast 
majority of alleged facts of the asserted claim 
arose from activities within the state of Utah. 
Most of the negotiations and the January 5th con-
tract were consummated in Utah. Most of the per-
formance required by both the plaintiff and the 
defendant were generated from activities within 
the state of Utah. The damages to plaintiff result-
ing from the defendant's failure to manufacture 
any boots and fill any of plaintiff's orders, lies 
within the state of Utah. 
The seventh guideline, that of relative hard-
ship or convenience, is clear in the case at bar. 
The plaintiff has become insolvent as a result of 
the defendant's failure to fill its orders for plain-
tiff's sole product. Likewise, the officers of 
plaintiff are experiencing personal financial hard-
ship as a result of corporate loans that they guaran-
teed in furtherance of the contract between the 
parties. The plaintiff is totally without funds 
to effectively pursue this litigation outside of 
Utah. (Jolly Aff. R51) The defendant, on the other 
hand, is a company whose sales total in the millions 
of dollars and who has assets and resources far 
i 
beyond those of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the 
current defendant, Union Plastics Corporation of 
California, is a subsidiary of the Union Corporation, 
a large corporate conglomerate who has heretofore 
financed the project. (R93) The resources and assets 
of the parent company number in the of millions 
of dollars. Certainly the defendant has the finan-
cial ability to defend this litigation within the 
State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED ITSELF TO IN 
PERSONAM JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH 
At the time this action was by plaintiff's 
service of summons commenced, the parties were 
engaged in settlement negotiations. In order to 
enhance the prospects of a settlement, plaintiff 
stipulated that it would not require defendant to 
file an answer until 20 days after service on defend-
ant's attorney of a written notice demanding the 
answer. In return for plaintiff's granting the 
extension of time to answer, defendant stipulated 
and agreed that it would accept and be bound by 
service of the demand upon its attorney. The simple 
complaint actually filed was the agreed method 
for plaintiff to preserve its service of process 
with the understanding that the complaint would 
be amended if negotiations failed. Defendant thus 
further stipulated that plaintiff could file an 
amended complaint without leave of court, and that 
such amended complaint would be acknowledged and 
accepted if served upon defendant's attorney. It 
is universally acknowledged that in personam juris-
diction can be conveyed by consent of the defendant. 
Re-statement 2d of Conflict of Laws, section 32 
(1971). Through the stipulation of the parties, 
and in exchange for the privilege of not being 
required to respond to plaintiff's pleadings, pending 
the outcome of the settlement negotiations, defendant 
agreed to have plaintiff's pleadings served upon 
its attorney, and thereby submitted itself to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state. 
II. 
THE COURTS OF UTAH CLEARLY HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWER TO ASSERT JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE UNDER 
APPLICABLE U.S. SUPREME COURT DUE PROCESS CASES. 
As this court is already well-versed in the 
history of iri personam jurisdiction since Pennoyer 
vs. Neff, 95 US 714 (1877), it is unnecessary to 
trace in detail that development. A brief summary 
of the present standards established by the Supreme 
Court will suffice. The pivotal case in the evolution 
of in. personam jurisdiction is, of course, Inter-
national Shoe vs. Washington, 326 US 310 (1945), 
wherein the Supreme Court abandoned the old concepts 
of "power," "implied consent," "constructive pres-
ence," and "doing business" in favor of the new 
"minimum contacts" standard. The court stated the 
test as follows: 
Due process requires only that in order to 
subject a defendant to a judgment in. personam, 
if he be not present within the territory of 
the forum, he will have certain minimum con-
tacts with it such that the maintenance of 
the suit does not offend traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice. 
This constitutional standard was further expanded 
by the court in subsequent cases. In McGee vs. 
International Life Insurance Company, 335 US 220 
(1957), the Supreme Court upheld California's as-
sertion of jurisdiction over a Texas corporation 
holding: 
It is sufficient for purposes of due process 
that the suit was based on a contract which 
had substantial connection with the state.... 
The extant of the defendant's contact with the state 
of California in McGee was a single life insurance 
contract between defendant and plaintiff, a resident 
of California. The defendant had no office or agent 
in California, and apart from the contract involved 
in the litigation, had never transacted any business 
in California. A reinsurance certificate offering 
to insure the plaintiff in accordance with specified 
terms was mailed to plaintiff in California. The 
plaintiff accepted the offer and paid the premiums 
by mail from California. Thus, under McGee, an 
isolated contract with a resident of the forum 
state satisfied the requirements of due process, 
even though a] ] contact and correspondence was 
through t,J:i( • ma i ] , 
The next year the court reiterated the mini -
mum contacts r cqui rcniont and added <i I in 1 her cHidan-
ationi 
It is essential in each case that there be 
some act by which the defendant purposely avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum state. Hansen vs. Denckla 
357 US 235 (1958). 
The essence of the holding '• n Hansen is that the 
minimum contacts, or due process requirement/ can-
not be met merely by uni ntentional and unforseeable 
c o n t a c t w :i t: 1 I t. h e f o i: i i m s t a t e. 
In ligl it of the controlli ng Supreme Court 
authorities and the facts of th is case, Union Plas-
t :i c s ' h a s u n q u e s t i o n a b 1 y 1 I a d s u f f i c i e n t c o n t a c t with • 
this state to permit tl le Utah courts to assert jur-
isdJ " ! . - • >C* . -. '* . .. 
of the Federal Constitution . Defendant 1^ contacts 
with plaintiff - • the state* m * KI V;->C certainly 
not - ' 
the defendant availed itseii o; th 1 privilege *;4 
working and dealing with a Utal I corporation for 
the express purpose of fur tl ier:i i ig i ts manufacturing 
activities through a Utah outlet. It is equally 
as clear under McGee 11 iat a contract requi ring 
a Utah corporation, w:i th i t s S( )le P:l ace of business 
' h 
d e f e n d a n t t h e f i r s t y e a r iii.j :? %:t\A. 
the second year, i las " substant > 1 -onrv- ct i on,! v * th 
the state of Utal i, i \ coir ,; 
this case with the nature and extent -.-: t:m contacts 
he] d siiffi c:i e n t J :)y 11 ie Suprerne Co 1 i:i , i uLurnatiom..-
Shoe and McGee can lead only to the conclusion 
that the constitutional "mini mum contacts" test 
h a s b e e i 1 s a t i s f i e d :ii i i t 1 :i i s c a s e. 
111 
J URISDICTION UNDER THE UTAH ".LONG-ARM" STATUTE IS 
CO-EXTENSIVE WITH THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIRE-
MENTS OF Di: JE PROCESS AND SHOT JI .E BE A PPI JED TC • T H I S 
CASE. 
Following iho pronouncement - tv su reme 
Coiir i. <>l i I w . ,, ;•> I I bera 1 (; u % . * ,'...:. . 
standard for in. personam jurisdiction, most states, 
including Utah, adopted the Uniform, Inter-state 
and International Procedure Act, common1y known 
as the "long-arm" statute. This uniform act was 
d e s i gne d t o e x t en d 11 i e j \ 11: i s d i c t :i o i I :> f s t a te c o u r t; s 
over non-resident defendants to the maximum extent 
permissible under the ,1 4th Amendmer * Not wanting 
I:c: ] ea V«E i any doi ii )t as 1 ::<:> til le ] < =g*.. -. ..Live purpose 
or the scope of in personam jurisdiction i i i this 
st .it I' ,. I hi* 1 e q i s T nt l i r e in ov i i jod I he f*« »1 It iw I i i " | 
preamble to the statute: 
It Is declared; as a matter of legislative 
determination, that the public interest de-
mands that the state provide its citizens with 
an effective means of redress against non-resi-
dent persons, wl 10 through certain significant 
minimal contacts with this state, incur obli-
gations to citizens entitled to the state's 
protection. This legislative action is deemed 
necessary because of technological progress 
which has substantially increased the flow 
of commerce between the several states resulting 
in increased interaction between persons of 
thi s state and persons of other states. 
The provisions of this act, to insure maximum 
protection to citizens of this state, should 
be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over 
non-resident defendants to the fullest extent 
permitted by the due process clause of the 
14th Amendment to the United States Const!tnitioit. 
U.C.A. 78-27-22 (supp. 1969 
1
 I .i ! :i iitp] ementd i lg the pi lrpose of tl le 
statute the legislature enumerated specific acts 
upon whicl i "long-arm,11 juri sdiction may be based, 
p i: o v i d i i i g i i i p e i: 1: :! i I e i I !: j: • a i: 1 1 : . 
Any person, notwithstanding section 16-10-102, 
whether or not a citizen or resident of this 
state, who in person or through an agent does 
any of the following enumerated acts, submits 
himself, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any claim arising' 
from: 
] , The transaction of any business within 
this state; 2. Contracting to supply 
services or goods in this state; , . . 
Consistent with the mandate that jurisdiction be 
asserted over non-residents to 1 :he fu1 1 est exten.t 
permi t t ed b;y the Federal Consti I: iiiti oi i i s the de l : in i -
i • i e s s 
withj a ifti - t.citt -u* - s e c t i o n c . 3 -
27-2 3 defines the phrase as fol ] owsi 
The words "transaction of business within 
this state" mean activities of a non-resident 
person, his agents, or representatives in this 
state which affect persons or businesses within 
the state of Utah, 
It i s clear from the expression of legislative intent 
and from the formulation and language of the rema in-
dvv of I In1 "ill -il ult1 t li.ii I lii1, sidle hii'. 3 egi slati ely 
abandoned tne oln concept: , , .i * ^ ,nbtracti\e 
presence," "implied consent, ! .. ; i! J \ ; business" 
whi cl i ve n. ,,.•-•'•.; 
t a c t s w i th the lir-rum s t a t e .J:; I .
 J c adopted t h e 
mi i i i mum -1'* . •' -• i Cdiiadiu e n u n u i d c e d by Liit; United 
States Supreme Court. 
The defendant has suggested and it is possible 
void :,' any explanation \->i: it. i....]:uij that r. . 
Utah "long-arm" statu*-*- should not apply - t:-u 
Pi lintiff contends tiia- it. a^eci ;o' .,c plead ,: 
ar "oecific language. As already stated, it was 
agreed between the parties t -.at „i.., .tiff would 
file a simple one page complai- r..« preserve, it-
sei vi ce of si lmmoi is ,- t i lat I: tic *> -r. >i 
have t o answer t h e complaint a : .* i l i" i n ner n o t i c e 
- 2 3 -
and that plaintiff would be allowed to expand and 
replead its causes ot -u-io:: 1/ imendment.. , 1^4 
Pia1111i f:f t. i',11,1s 'ixcn b i n l 
exists to set forth - u: cau^ ink : i n appropriate 
theories includlnq urisdictiona i fact-- , etc* 
Plaintiff's demand ^ r an answ < y 
complaint came when negotiations ceased. Plaintiff 
comi i •'•!!:. 'plaint but received 
defendant'_• motions L„ quash ai .: (usmiss before 
the amendments were filed• Plaintiff is unable to 
determine from the disLii.'l .:r*. 11 t.. ioeisi'ii »dhd her 
the "long-arm" statute was even considered. The 
p.l eadi I;-J/ < ley stand should be construed to 
include a 1 .. theories of j urisdiction in 11 <j111*. o f 
the stipulation between the parties for amending the 
complaint. 
V 
DEFENDANT'S ACTIVITIES BRING IT WELL WITHIN THE 
SCOPE OF THE UTAH "LONG-ARM" STATUTE BASED ON THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT AN EXCELIS IVK SALES AN)) MER-
CHANDIZING DISTRIBUTORSHIP CONTRACT WAS NEGOTIATED 
IN UTAH AND GOODS WERE CONTRACTUALLY SOLD IN I JT£ H 
In the instant case only two requirements under 
the Utah f: 1 ^ng-arm1' statute must be met to assert 
jurisdict 1 » * 1 **- ^ 1 
1, Union Plastics must have either (A) 
been involved in activities in this state 
which affected persons or businesses within 
the state, which is "the transaction of 
business, or (B) "contracted to supply services 
or goods to a person or business in this state/ 1 
and 
2 . P l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m liiiisl .trisi 1 trrmi raieh 
activities. 
I.I i i:i 11 o I d e r 11 e d I: h a1 1Jl "I, a i. n 1; i. f I * •  \ i" „1 a i ni r i r i s e s f i" < > n i 
the activities related to or based upon the contract 
dated January '5, 1974, The ori.b, question, therefore, 
is whethe: - -n Plastics activities can be cone l iiutcJI 
i' • 'it- transaction t.\ business within this state, 
• • : ' sei: vi ees or goods in 
this statt. - comparisoi I of tl le facts in this case 
with other cases . - i ch this coui t and other courts 
have applied the - : • ; : is 
that this questio ~ .xt D U answerec :* the affirma-
ti ve and not in the .. :.^ . :v^ a;* th-r *:r" i\ C O U I L 
may have ruled. ^ I I K L \:H_ .-L.ii "tatute , s a uniform 
act adopted by-many other states, the construction 
of tl le ac t: b} bhe coi lr ts Df atl ler states i s a ] so 
relevant, It should also be noted that the statute 
has been upheld against const r .it:io;iai attacks ;n 
states across tl le . • •• > 
in Utal i so as to O/it na jurisdiction ? t^e fuj'.^st 
extent permitted I: * •- :*>nsH« ^-.ion. 
First f cases applying the "transaction of business" 
provisions of the statute wllJ 1: >e compared with 
the present case. Foreign Study League vs. Holland-
America Line, 27 Utah 2d 442 49 7 P 2d'244 (1972), 
has so many factual similarities with the present 
case t hat" t -let/d i 1 o«l n'ye»u el "'lie 1 acts is warranted. 
The plaintiff was a Utah corporation which chartered 
ships to foreign lands for eu 
The defendant .» > a foreign corporation with offices 
in Rotterdam, :J<_W YOI /. , Angeles, * " other ports. 
r . * -
area of charter service*- defendant ,*. - )i es 
or offices nn^ ; .-i i*r-^o: r personnel ±n utdii. 
The on] y outlet, or contact, of defendant with the 
state was through travel agencies authorized 
book its services. ' •* ..•••• 
ant's representatives .^ -i LuiL.- ..A .• ;.-* J re. : i J" 
Utah ie, encourage i* fu yej L defendant's space on 
a i ( • . • • -,i d'.: iendant 
and _•".- state ei utan relied ue^rj ie .plaintiff * J 
jurisdiction over the person oi defendant, and of 
t:.. - • litiqati on arose were 
related to a;: attempt * > • * * . m agreement to 
chartei J r • e e . '.^nidtions 1 < « >k j: LI ace i i I Sa ] 1 . 
lie;-*-., -i'-y v-i*-. * > v-'.v Ynv-v There w a s correspondence 
h% - e L telegram, and telephone 'between the 
• - • W u ,i S t M i l , I i.) | f 1 a i n I in I  II 
in Salt Lake City, but it was n \ 
factory and defendant sent an a-,.- = .r. •<: Sd.i liuKt 
City to "confer wi th plaintiff's officers re, a 
fl • te en in i sunders t ami i IKJ . J, In I In njnl I'licl ' ' 
The contract was sent back to defendant unsigned* 
iclear the contract was not signed, I Hit: 
j.-.ck was sent to defendant i.n con-
nection with the negotiations. Based on these facts, 
tint J »fi" e n (J a n!;, 11. J I 1 t r. 1111»-™ 
acfrii business n. i-x.^u under ti. » letter arid spirit 
of International Shoe, Hill vs. Zjale^ an earlier 
opinion of this court, <md the IHVJI'I "long-arm" 
statute. The court; added that I:he plaintiff's case 
was further strengthened J-- - i s 
whi ch defendant had *• ••-i in io..;.ia travel agents. it 
was also implied in • * = » ,;;.;ar*d. op.rii.on that the 
(i)l a] n f i H:'' s * '-I 'ic* v." »" ;••:••- : -,,'--. «• . , f 
the agency agreements nud been xciusive agreements, 
imposing a higher degree of conl rol over the agents. 
Mr 3 list ice Crockett, win » d i s sen ted , i IKHeated he 
may have concurred ii I the majority opinion had there 
been a valid contract between plaintiff - w1 
ant, AIL oi these factors are preserv .;. IA^ instant 
case, That then was a con tra*..d is -•:>: disputed. 
Defei : t - - ' r . * * ? - l u -
sive sales and merchandizing operation," Under 
t h e terms o i u ' - ^ ••'•• i.i, extremely t i ght c o n t r o l s , 
S U C h a s m i n i m m J . . i . ; ; , i . I K M I l l S , i l l ' i 1 l l l l p O S O t j 
on plaintiff. 
In ci'ini.T'-'^ it t.u l''oreigr^ Stiid^ L e a g u e v s . H o l l a n d -
America Line is Mack Financial Corporation vs. 
Nevada Motor Rentals,.Incorporated, a case recently . 
d e c i d e d b y t h i s c o i 11: t < J, r n 1 a p p a r o u t J.)" i: € 1 i e 
by the tri a] court i i 1 tl le present case. Mack Financial 
Corporation is clearly distinguishable on the facts 
from the present case. Nevada Motor Rentals, a 
foreign corporation, purchased trucks In Denver, 
Co.] or ado, on: i :: Dndd t: i onaJ sal es contracts from f lack 
Trucks, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Mack Trucks 
assigned its interest I n the sales contracts to 
MacK Financial , * , s ^  ^ . tl 
r. u, business * : , Nevada encountered dif-
f 4 • :- i'i.' • *v uents ana arranged t* M . ^  
the trucks and im. contracts over to an Idaho busi-
ness entity- .) inco the contracts forbade an assign-
rv * * _ * . 
assignee, Nevada sent *• is ! :t.:) Utah to request 
consent to an assignment. Mack Financial made i ts 
owi 1 i nvestigatJ oi i a i id prepared ai id si gi led ai i as si gn 
ment. Nevada's assignee defaulted on the contracts 
ancl a n a c t : L o n w a s brought o n the contracts naming 
Nevada as a party defendant, This court correctly 
found on these facts that jurisdiction could not 
1 >e assei: ted ove. t Nevada. Nevada h.iJ *- l contracted 
Lu supply anything in Utah and f h e . i. >;.i.ff 's claim 
did not arise out of any t r a n s a d it « • i usiness 
by Nevada :i i 1 tl le s tate Nevac i 
state of Utah was requesting Financial ; consent 
to an assignment and the l.iintiff1 ' < u n did rmt 
arise out of this act. "• . .1 . j To contend 
that Mack Financial Corporation controls the present 
case. 
The California "long-arm" statute construed 
in Buckeye Boiler Company vs, Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County, 8 0 < -,_ .-::>.:*- •--..•] * 
57 (1969), provided, as does the Utah statute, 
th.it jurisdiction was to be extended as far as permis-
sible under the 14th Amendment, The exact statutory 
language in issue was "doing business,11 The California 
Supreme Coin: I: coi istr i led tl: le sta t i ite to mean that 
there must be economic activity m uhe part of the 
defendant in the forum state, -J I i.in!- t :\o cause 
o f a c t i o n mu s t a ::i: i s e o i 11 o f , • \ i 
defendant's forum related activity, The defendant, 
Buckeye , had no agent, office, sales representative, 
exclusive agency or exclusive sales outlet, warehouse, 
stock of merchandise, property, or bank account 
i i I CaJ iforn :i a I t: cl :i ::i i lot s 3J ] oi l c ::::)! isi gnment b ::::::),. 
and, had i 10 • ::::oiiiiri,.:i ssi 01 1 agreemei i t: '" -* ;\i 
or entity it1 California. However, : ; J period 
of five years prior 10 plaintiff's injury, the 
defendant had sold nrp.ssnre tanks to Cochin Manu-
facturing Company, v ' M o <orporatioi , w.,ioh ; i < 
tdi ! lit'(] ,i in.inii I f i r i u i i n « j | -1 m i i i inn 
Cochin ordered some tanks directly from that p,lant 
and purchased others throun if Oh i ; office. 
plan Francisco JIM-M iros-, sales f. , .chin 
ranged from $25,000, l J U . U U , Other !n i 
the sales to Cochin, Buckeye had no contact with 
anyone i n the state of Californi a. Nevertheless, 
the Cour t: 1 ie] d : 
A manufacturer engages in economic activity 
within a state as a matter of commercial ac-
tuality whenever the purchase or use of its 
product within the state generates gross in-
come for the manufacturer and is not so for-
tuitous or unforseeable as to negative the 
existence of an intent on the manufacturer's 
part to bring about this result. . « • 
In the present casef it is clear that defendant 
derives substantial economic benefit from the 
sale and use of its products in California; 
it currently derives about $30,000.00 annually 
in gross sales revenues from its direct sales 
of certain pressure tanks to the Cochin Manu-
facturing Company plant in South San Francisco. 
On the basis of these sales alone, defendant 
is purposely engaging in economic activity 
within California as a matter of commercial 
actuality. 
That Union Plastics products were purchased 
i i l "I J t a 1 i b y I J i l i o i i S k i , g e n e i: a t i i i g g i: o s s :i i i c o in e t o 
Plastics, can in no way be considered fortuitous 
or unforseeable. Such economic activity by Plastics 
in Utah was the object of the contract calling for 
a continuous economic activity in Utah amounting 
to millions of dollars. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explained 
the meaning and proper application of the term 
"transaction of business within this state" in Doyn 
Aircraft/ Inc. vs. Wylie, 443 F. 2d 579, Tenth 
Circuit, (1971), a case factually very similar to 
the present case. The Court held: 
In a broad sense business is transacted with-
in the state when an individual is within or 
enters this state in person or by agent and 
through dealing with another within this state, 
effectuates or attempts to effectuate a purpose 
to improve his economic conditions and satisfy 
his desires. 
The Court further held that acts of negotiating 
a contract were business transactions in the sense 
that the defendant "was trying to effectuate a pur-
pose to improve his economic conditions and satisfy 
his desires, and that in so doing he purposely 
availed himself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum state." See also Hunter 
Hayes Elevator Co. V. Petroleum Club Inn 419 P. 
2d 465 (1966) where the New Mexico State Supreme 
Court upheld jurisdiction where the only contact 
with New Mexico was preliminary negotiation of a 
contract. 
The Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, 
affirmed a decision of the Federal District Court 
in Illinois, upholding jurisdiction over an English 
corporation under the Illinois "long-arm" statute, 
which is word for word the same as the Utah statute. 
The Court held: 
i 
A defendant who sends an agent into Illinois 
to solicit or to negotiate a contract is trans-
acting business within the statutory definition. 
The fact that some of the important pre-contract 
negotiations were conducted elsewhere than 
Illinois and that the actual execution of the 
contract occurred outside of Illinois' borders 
is immaterial. Scovill Manufacturing Company 
vs. Dateline Electric Company, 461 F. 2d 897" 
7th Circuit, 1972) 
11
 Long-arm" jurisdiction was asserted over Utah 
residents Who secured a bank loan in Colorado by 
the courts of that state under the Colorado "long-
arm" statute, which is also identical to the Utah 
statute. The issue and holding in that case were 
stated by the Court as follows: 
So, the precise question to be resolved, then, 
is whether the bank's cause of action does, 
or does not, "arise from" the transaction by 
the petitioners of "any business" within the 
state of Colorado. We hold that the bank's 
claim does arise from the transaction of "any 
business11 by the two petitioners within this 
state, and that under the circumstances the 
service of process was quite properly upheld 
by the trial court. 
It seems evident to us that the petitioners 
most certainly did transact business within 
this state. To illustrate, petitioners, and 
each of them, voluntarily left their place 
of residents in Utah and made the long journey 
to Adams County in Colorado. There they very 
successfully negotiated a loan of $30,000.00 
from the bank. At this same time and place, 
the petitioners, in return for this loan, exe-
cuted and delivered to the bank their promis-
sory note in the principal amount of $30,000.00. 
Surely, it cannot be seriously denied that 
the petitioners, physically present within 
the state, did transact business—and about 
$30,000.00 worth of business—within this state. 
Knight vs. District Court of Seventeenth i 
Judicial District, County of Adams, 424 P 2d 
110 Colorado (1967). 
Oregon has also adopted precisely the same 
"long-arm" statute as Utah. In State, ex rel. 
White Lumber Sales, Inc. vs. Sulmonetti, 448 P 
2d 571 Oregon (1968), the Oregon Supreme Court upheld 
the assertion of Jurisdiction over a non-resident 
on the basis of a single telephone order for a 
carload of plywood. The Court, noting the statutory 
definition of "transaction of business" said, "It 
is clear that the placing of the telephoned order 
had effects, or 'significant contacts,1 in Oregon." 
It is even more clear that Plastics1 activities 
in this case have had effect on persons and businesses 
in Utah. 
The holdings of these cases and many more are 
represented to some extent in Re-Statement 2d, 
Conflict of Laws, section 84, comment at 91. 
It is reasonable that a state should have judicial 
jurisdiction over any individual as to causes 
of action arising from an act done for pecuniary 
profit having substantial consequences within 
the state even though the act is an isolated 
act not constituting the doing of business 
within the state. 
Certainly, it cannot be denied that the acts of 
the defendant in this case were done for pecuniary 
profit, nor can it be denied that the consequences 
of these acts suffered by plaintiff are subtantial. 
In the following three cases, "long-arm"
 x 
statutes containing provisions similar to the Utah 
provision for jurisdiction over any person contract-
ing to supply services or goods in the state are 
construed and applied. The following facts were 
the basis of jurisdiction in Kornfuehrer vs. Phila-
delphia Bindery, Inc., 240 F,* supp. 157 (1965). 
The plaintiff wrote the defendant to ask if it 
manufactured spring back binders. A series of 
letters followed in which the parties discussed 
specifications and terms. For the purposes of the 
case it was assumed that in late March the plaintiff 
placed an order for 7,500 binders and the defendant 
accepted it. A few days later the defendant wrote 
the plaintiff, telling him that it had made an error 
in its cost estimates and would not be able to pro-
duce exactly the type of binder he wanted except at 
a substantially higher cost. The plaintiff replied 
that he had already made commitments which prevented 
him from allowing the order to be cancelled and he 
eventually instituted suit for breach of contract. 
The court relied on three legal issues from the 
Supreme Court opinion in McGee and found all three 
to support jurisdiction in the case. 
1. The contract was delivered in the forum 
state. 
2. Payment was made from the forum state. 
3. The plaintiff was a resident of the forum. 
The court dealt with another of the defendants 
arguments as follows: 
The shipment was to be FOB Philadelphia and 
those shipping terms have served as the basis 
for an argument on the part of the bindery 
that no part of the contract was to be per-
formed by it in Minnesota. 
Actually the argument seems irrelevant. If 
the transfer of the binders is not considered 
a part of the defendant's performance, then it 
is part of the plaintiff's. Any realistic 
treatment of the transaction must view the 
carrier bringing the shipment as the agent of 
one or both of the parties• As mentioned 
earlier, the One-Act statute applies when an 
act of either party is to be performed in 
Minnesota. 
Whether defendant in this case claims it was to ship 
ski boots FOB Los Angeles to plaintiff or to plaintiff's 
customers under the contract/ the fact remains that the 
boots were to be supplied to customers in the state of Utah 
since both plainciff and many of plaintiff's customers 
are Utah residents. 
Defendant has argued that the courts of this 
state cannot assert jurisdiction over it because 
the contract between plaintiff and defendant was to 
be performed outside of the state of Utah* This 
issue was dealt with in Midwest Packaging Corporation 
vs. Realikon Plastics, Ltd., 279 F. Supp. 816 (1968). 
In response to the same argument made by defendant 
in the present case; the court held: 
Further, it cannot be denied that the contract 
as alleged by plaintiff was to be performed in 
whole or in part in Iowa. Plaintiff is any 
Iowa corporation with its principal place of 
business in Iowa. Therefore, by necessity, 
many of the acts required for performance of 
the alleged exclusive sales contract would 
take place in Iowa. Thus, the defendant has 
failed to rebut the prima facie showing by 
plaintiff of the existence of such a contaact, 
thereby naking the provisions of section 617.3 
applicable to the case at bar. 
The same result was reached in Clark Advertising 
Agency, Inc. vs. Tice, 331 F. Supp. 1058 Northern 
District of Texas, 1971. That court held: 
The "long-arm" statute clearly applies regard-
less of which party it is who does the per-
formance in Texas 
V 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS JURISDICTION UNDER THE TRADITIONAL 
MINIMUM CONTACTS THEORY. 
Even if the lower court does not have jurisdiction 
over the defendant under 78-27-24, U.C.A. (supp. 
1969), the courts of Utah do have jurisdiction over 
the defendant under the traditional "minimum contacts" 
theory. This court has recognized the minimum contacts 
theory of International Shoe; etc. in recent cases. 
be performed outside of the state of Utah* This 
issue was dealt with in Midwest Packaging Corporation 
vs. Realikon Plastics, Ltd., 279 F. Supp. 816 (1968). 
In response to the same argument made by defendant 
in the present case; the court held: 
Further, it cannot be denied that the contract 
as alleged by plaintiff was to be performed in 
whole or in part in Iowa. Plaintiff is any 
Iowa corporation with its principal place of 
business in Iowa. Therefore, by necessity, 
many of the acts required for performance of 
the alleged exclusive sales contract would 
take place in Iowa. Thus, the defendant has 
failed to rebut the prima facie showing by 
plaintiff of the existence of such a contaact, 
thereby naking the provisions of section 617.3 
applicable to the case at bar. 
The same result was reached in Clark Advertising 
Agency, Inc. vs. Tice, 331 F. Supp. 1058 Northern 
District of Texas, 1971. That court held: 
The "long-arm" statute clearly applies regard-
less of which party it is who does the per-
formance in Texas 
V 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS JURISDICTION UNDER THE TRADITIONAL 
MINIMUM CONTACTS THEORY. 
Even if the lower court does not have jurisdiction 
over the defendant under 78-27-24, U.C.A. (supp. 
1969), the courts of Utah do have jurisdiction over 
the defendant under the traditional "minimum contacts" 
theory. This court has recognized the minimum contacts 
theory of International Shoe; etc. in recent cases. 
While this court set down some guidelines in Hill v. 
Zale Corporation No. 12136, Utah Supreme Court, March 
9, 1971, each case must be considered on its own 
facts within the bounds of justice and fair play. 
A careful analysis of defendant's business activities 
in the state of Utah are sufficient to assert juris-
diction. 
i 
Using the guidelines of Mack v. Nevada, Supra 
the court apparently failed to consider the following 
activities of defendant. Plaintiff was defendants 
sole marketing operation/ in Utah, nationally and 
internationally. Defendant hired, fired and paid 
Utah residents on an hourly basis. This evidences 
that part of defendants performance of his obligations 
under the contract were performed .in Utah. Defendant 
brought literature about defendant to Utah for dis-
tribution to aid in sales. Defendant provided pictures 
of defendant's plant for enclusion in sales literature. 
Defendant participated in plaintiffs sales meetings 
and staffed plaintiff's sales booths. The defendant 
insisted its name UNION be "put before the buying 
public". (R110) Defendant negotiated banking arrange-
ments with a Utah bank. Defendant's personnel of the 
highest level came to Utah several times to review 
plaintiff's progress and the progress of their design 
work. Defendant shipped personal property to and from 
Utah and still has some here. Most of the contract 
actually performed was in Utah. The contract provided 
for sales in the millions of dollars and was to continue 
over a period of years. Defendant was paid $25,000.00 
in Utah. Plaintiff's performance in Utah generated 
acknoweldged orders for defendant's new boots in 
excess of $250,000.00. Defendant's failure to deliver 
a single order to plaintiff and its customers turned 
plaintiff's performance into a financial nightmare 
for plaintiff and its principal officers that personally 
guaranteed plaintiffs performance• Defendant's breach 
has resulted in plaintiff being financially unable 
to effectively seek relief against defendant outside 
of Utah. In contrast defendant does have the assets 
and capital to defend its actions in the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, the trial court erred 
in not finding sufficient minimum contact to sustain 
jurisdiction. There is no due process reason why 
defendant, engaging purposefully in all of the above 
conduct in Utah, would be treated unfaiirly and unjustly 
if the Utah courts required it to defend claims based 
on those purposeful acts either under the Utah 
"long-arm" statute or under the traditional minimum 
contacts theory. It is also evident that the lower 
court erred in interpreting the law and in failing 
to consider defendant's total undisputed substantial 
business contacts with the State of Utah, The ruling 
below on defendant's motion to dismiss should be 
reversed and the lower court be required to assert 
jurisdiction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
i 
J. Brent Wood 
Counsel for Appelant 
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